CROSS MIGRATION | by IMISCOE

Policy Briefs WP4–7

Key Knowledge Questions



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Policy Briefs WP4–7

Key Knowledge Questions on Migration for Policy Stakeholders & Researchers

February 2020

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Introduction

These policy briefs about key knowledge questions on migration are the result of a collaboration between Work Packages 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Horizon 2020 project, CrossMigration. They are intended to introduce new policymakers to what insights existing research can offer for understanding and addressing pressing questions on the topic.

Led by MPI Europe, Work Package 1 set out to define a set of empirical questions that are at the heart of major policy decisions that European policymakers are currently facing and will face in the coming decade. These questions synthesise the key areas of interest based on consultations with over 30 policymakers at EU, national and local level and the CrossMigration research partners. These questions are forward-looking, focusing on what knowledge will be needed to inform policymaking in the field of migration in the next 5 to 10 years.

Work Packages 4-7 bring together leading experts on the themes of Migration Drivers, Migration Infrastructures, Migration Forms, and Migration Governance. They were led by Danube University Krems (DUK), the Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (DeZIM), the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the University of Lisbon (IGOT-UL), the Centre of Migration Research Warsaw (CMR), and the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute (EUI), along with members of the IMISCOE research network:

Migration drivers are structural elements that have the potential to facilitate, enable, constrain, or trigger migration. Migration drivers might increase or decrease the salience of migration, the likelihood of certain migration routes, and the desirability of different destinations. The term is more encompassing than 'migration determinants' or 'root causes' of migration, which generally ignore human agency in the decision to migrate and assume a deterministic and causal relationship between one or more structural factors and migration. Migration drivers, however, affect migration directly but also, and most importantly, indirectly and in combination with other migration drivers, in complex migration driver configurations. While the migration driver environment might be the same for two individuals, different migration drivers affect them differently depending on individual characteristics.

Figure 1
Overview Work Packages



The emerging field of **migration infrastructures** sheds light on the processes that occur between the decision to migrate is made and arrival in the receiving country. It primarily asks the question of how people migrate, taking the perspective of the receiving country in three different angles: First, it focuses on regular and irregular, commercial and non-commercial actors facilitating migration, including visa brokers, work recruitment agencies, marriage migration platforms, human smugglers and humanitarian organisations. Then, it looks at the logistics of migration, exploring the role of routes, transit hubs and means of transportation. Finally, it investigates how digital technologies like the internet and social media shape mobility and influence migratory pathways.

The notion of **migration forms** concerns the question of who migrates. Global migration forms, or flows, include regular and irregular migrants who migrate for a broad array of reasons. Different migration forms are characterized by multiple and dynamic aspects. The differences between migration forms relate to variations in migration drivers, infrastructures, policies and experiences that shape migrants' journeys. The Migration Research Hub encompasses a research on a range of different migration forms – a specific set of migration forms are included in the database as they reflect the existing body of knowledge and focus regarding f migration research on forms. While these are differentiated in a categorical manner, migration forms – and motivations – are rarely straightforward. Indeed, migration forms and flows are increasingly highlighted as mixed, as individuals' motivations can be multiple and constantly developing throughout migration processes.

Migration governance includes, but is broader than, migration policies. While the latter refers to laws, regulations, decisions or other government directive related to migration, governance encompasses these elements as well as the factors related to decision-making processes and implementation. While the term governance is frequently used in the field of migration studies, it remains ill-defined. Definitions of governance typically focus on the observable outputs of governance processes.: i) norms, rules, policies, laws and institutions that can be binding or non-binding norms and frameworks, at the global, national or subnational levels.; ii) actors, institutions and institutional mechanisms; and iii) processes or methods of decision-making and of governing processes (including implementation and monitoring) that can be formal or informal and occur at different levels (local, national, global) and among diverse actors.

Figure 2
Simplified overview of project conceptual framework



We hope that you find these guides useful for navigating these key questions. For more information on the knowledge accumulation work of CrossMigration, please visit the YouTube channel (see QR code) to watch interviews with the authors. To find an index of knowledge and experts on migration all under one roof, be sure to visit and register at the Migration Research Hub (migrationresearch.com).

SCAN ME

WP4
Key Knowledge Questions on Migration **Drivers**

Introduction – what's at stake?

Roughly 3.5 percent of the world's population are international migrants, currently about 258 million people. Many more move within their own countries or for short periods of time. What drives human mobility? The answer is anything but simple. Often-cited causes, such as war, poverty or climate change, cannot explain why certain social groups are more likely to migrate than others, or why most of the world's population does not migrate at all despite difficult living conditions and uncertain future prospects. The aim of this guide is to offer a concise introduction into the state-of-the-art research on migration drivers and to outline key questions that European and national policymakers are invited to think through when developing migration policies.

To improve the design and effectiveness of future policy interventions on migration, it is crucial to grasp the migratory process in its entirety. Over the past decades, research has produced solid evidence on the forces that initiate and perpetuate migration. Today, researchers seek to better understand the respective weight and interactions of particular drivers, to find out which driver configurations prevail under what circumstances, and to identify which drivers are the most susceptible to be shaped by policy interventions. In particular, scholars have sought to better understand:

1. What are the main structural, macro-level drivers of migration and how do they interact?
2. Under what conditions do people develop aspirations to migrate and are able to realize them?
3. What is the role of meso-level factors such as migrant networks?
4. To what extent and how can policy interventions influence migration drivers?

Why do insights on migration drivers matter for policymaking?

To better anticipate future changes in global migration and to develop effective policy responses, it is imperative to understand the forces underlying migration. Research has provided key insights on the macro-, meso- and

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micro-level drivers of migration that, when addressed in policy design, allow to avoid counter-productive policy effects.

For instance, understanding why development cooperation will likely not reduce but increase emigration in the short or medium term or why tougher border controls can paradoxically lead to more irregular migration can improve the design and effectiveness of future policies. In a similar way, migration policies that clash with structural migration drivers in origin or destination countries are bound to produce unexpected effects: For example, the reduction of legal immigration channels for low-skilled workers in times of economic growth at the destination will inevitably increase informal employment of migrants.

Furthermore, policy measures do often not take into account how entry regulations affect migrants' propensity to permanently settle or to return; how policy effects vary in the short- and long-term; or how regulations on family and labor migration also affect student and refugee inflows, and vice-versa. Indeed, the legal categories central to European policy frameworks (such as legal/illegal migration, economic/family migrants or refugees) tend to not accurately reflect the reality in which migratory motives overlap and shift over time. Any assessment of policy effectiveness therefore has to take into account the entire migration complex and to consider how different origin and migrant communities might react differently to similar driver configurations or policy interventions.

Ultimately, moving away from a 'one-size-fits-all' approach would allow to better align policy expectations, policy instruments and policy results. The following section presents key research insights and questions on migration drivers that may inform and inspire future thinking and policymaking on migration.

Opening the black box of migration drivers

1 Macro-level driver constellations

Simplistic discourses that cast war and poverty as main migration drivers have lost ground. It is now well established that people move for multiple

reasons, with economic, political, social, personal and community-related motives overlapping and potentially reinforcing or cancelling out each other. Over the past decades, research has advanced key insights on the ways in which structural migration drivers shape international migration in complex, yet patterned ways.

A first key finding is that development – in the form of rising incomes, educational expansion, or improved infrastructure – usually leads to more migration: It gives people the financial, human and social resources to move in the first place. Only in the long term might human development and opportunities to realize life aspirations at home decrease migration aspirations. Ultimately, the idea that migration can be reduced through small-scale, short-term development aid interventions is misleading. Instead of absolute poverty, which can often prevent people from moving, local levels of inequality and feelings of relative deprivation are more important migration drivers. People usually develop life aspirations in reference to their peers or to the life standards of the local elite. This explains why areas or countries with high levels of inequality among social groups display on average higher emigration rates than more equal countries. It also helps to understand why for many migrant workers employment that is shunned by the population at the destination for reasons of social status still provides opportunities to climb up the social ladder in their countries of origin.

Second, political drivers such as war and violent conflict, as well as corruption and poor governance usually nurture people's aspirations to leave. However, they mostly lead to actual migration behavior in combination with economic factors. For example, many Syrians stayed in their hometowns years into the civil war and only fled to neighboring countries once their economic basis of subsistence eroded to an extent that staying was not viable anymore. Similarly, the Tunisian revolution and its migratory consequences were triggered by a combination of lacking political freedoms under a dictatorial regime and the systematic corruption within the Tunisian state apparatus that destroyed prospects for decent livelihoods and upward social mobility for the vast majority of the population.

However, war and corruption can also 'trap' people in conflict zones. The Yemeni conflict is a case in point, as despite a year-long, brutal conflict, the civilian population has not fled in significant numbers. This is not only because of policy restrictions in destination countries or Yemen's geographical position at the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, but also because of the country's low human and economic development levels before the way that now deprive the population of the social networks and economic means

necessary to flee. Comparing the Syrian and the Yemeni conflict might offer new insights into the (economic, geographic, historical) conditions under which war triggers large-scale emigration – or not. Ultimately, conflict, violence, political oppression and dictatorship have ambiguous effects on migration: While they usually increase the aspiration to migrate for specific parts of the population, they also tend to decrease their capabilities to move freely and seek life elsewhere.

Demographic factors such as fertility rates and 'population pressure' are also often cited migration drivers. Empirical evidence, however, has remained scant: While large generations of young people indeed create socio-political and labor market demands, the relation with migration is not clear. The effect of demographic growth on mobility is indeed largely mediated by a state's economic or education policies. From the perspective of an origin country, better access to education is likely to increase internal and international migration, especially if access to higher education and jobs that meet professional aspirations are not available locally. From a destination country perspective, the segmentation of labor markets into high-skilled and low-skilled segments, as well as the high specialization of workers tends to make the local economies structurally dependent on migration to fill labor demand, independent from national unemployment rates. Rigid immigration regulations that do not allow to hire foreign workers depending on employers' demands and needs are likely to increase the informal economy and irregular labor migration.

Lastly, the effects of climate change on migration are highly ambiguous: Some households may respond to changes in agricultural productivity by migrating, others do not necessarily have the financial capacity and are trapped in this vulnerable situation. Environmental change may thus increase migration aspirations but simultaneously erode financial assets, implying that in some situations environmental change can make migration less likely. As with demographic factors, adaptation to climate change interacts with previous mobility patterns from the same location and is mediated by state interventions: The resilience of populations to rising sea levels or hurricanes, as well as whether environmental disasters lead to permanent migration or short-term, short-distance displacement, importantly depends on public protection mechanisms put in place. In this vein, while advances in technology and infrastructure at first sight seem to facilitate mobility, they can also render permanent migration obsolete by allowing people to adapt to hostile climatic environments - such as heatwaves, floods or earthquakes.

2 Realizing migration aspirations

Gallup polls suggest that around 750 million people worldwide aspire to migrate; but most of them never do so. This is partly because many people face legal and financial barriers to mobility, such as visa regulations and limited legal channels for migrating, as well as a lack of financial resources and social networks. More importantly, however, human agency explains why the desire to move does not always equate actual movement and why individual migration decisions are not predictable based on combinations of structural factors alone.

Migrants might decide to take risks that seem irrational, driven by hope, love or a sense of adventure. Some people move as a measure of last resort, when they have reached a perceived bottom-line in the face of environmental degradation or political insecurity. Others move when things go well and they can access resources, as an investment into the future or a strategy to diversify risks. In the debate about migration, it is indeed often forgotten that many young people around the world move out of curiosity and not only out of need, as the high emigration rates of rich democracies attest. To understand how migration aspirations are turned into migratory behavior, it is important to conceive migration aspirations as embedded into a person's broader life aspirations and as part of livelihood strategies of an entire family or community. In turn, this allows to better assess how individuals and origin communities react differently to the same driver constellation.

Generally speaking, migration aspirations are more likely to be turned into migration behavior when a future life elsewhere is expected to bring improvements. However, such perceptions of livelihood improvements are relative: People might migrate not for their individual betterment, but within a family-wide strategy to mitigate vulnerabilities. And what may look like misery from a middle-class European perspective might still be empowering and considered a social upgrade when assessed from a origin community viewpoint. For instance, migration to the Gulf is perceived by many young Ethiopian women as a way to achieve independence from their families and pre-set life trajectories. This clashes with widespread discourses that cast this migration as human trafficking and call for victim protection.

At the same time, because migration aspirations are part of a person's life aspirations, they are likely to change when growing up, entering the labor market or starting a family. Migration might fit into a someone's life aspirations at one moment in time, but not anymore once migration could actually be realized. Vice-versa, people who never had the aspiration to move might find themselves abroad as a result of unexpected opportunities and changes in

circumstances. As research has shown, education levels are a relatively good indicator of whether migration aspirations translate into migration behavior, as people with tertiary education are most likely to eventually realize their migration aspirations. In contrast, migration aspirations are often not a reliable indicator for future migration in politically volatile or economically constrained contexts. Ultimately, migration aspirations are not set in stone – the circumstances and experience of migration itself will inevitably modify initial plans for on-migration or return. This is what makes actual migratory behavior so difficult to predict.

3 The role of meso-level networks

Once migration is set in motion between two countries or areas, often kick-started through state interventions such as recruitment programs, war, colonization or trade, it can become self-perpetuating. Migrant communities, transnational networks and diasporas play an important role in facilitating migration. On the one hand, they act as key informants by providing information on legal migration opportunities and the situation on the labor market. They are also essential in allowing migrants to find job, housing and to navigate public services at the destination. On the other hand, diasporas contribute to the development of their origin communities through investing in local projects, sending remittances home and herewith securing the livelihood of their (extended) families. However, as long as the structural migration drivers persist - such as perceived inequality and corruption, ideas of the good life that cannot be fulfilled at home or limited educational opportunities -, these actions are unlikely to significantly reduce migration.

Migrant communities can also increase migration aspirations through widening the mental world map of origin communities. As research has shown, migrants develop migration aspirations in relation to a particular place - their imaginations of possible destinations never comprise all countries in the world, but a specific set of countries based on countries' political, human, cultural and economic ties. This suggests that migration patterns are strongly path-dependent. However, they are not set in stone: Given the economic rise of countries such as Saudi Arabia or China, it is safe to assume that Europe will not necessarily remain the world's prime migration destination in the future.

The fact that global migration has over time concentrated in an increasingly smaller number of bilateral corridors also suggests that not all migrant networks lead to more migration. Migrants can not only function as 'bridgeheads', but also as 'gatekeepers', restricting access to information, jobs and social capital and hereby impede migration. However, it remains

unclear when migrant communities act as facilitator or obstacle for future migrants, given certain opportunities at the destination or composition of the diaspora. Similarly, while we know well how migrant communities emerge and establish themselves, we know little about why certain migration corridors wane and migration stops. Better understanding this dynamic is, however, an important area of future research.

To develop targeted and effective policy, it is important to realize that migrants are embedded in particular networks that shape not only migration aspirations but also the ability to realize them. Migration decisions do not follow rational cost-benefit calculations with access to perfect information; migration is a patterned phenomenon and migrant networks are important mediators through which information and imaginations are transmitted. Thus, a same policy intervention might affect migrant communities in very different ways, depending, among others, on the nationality of origin; class, ethnic group, gender and political positioning; or the characteristics of the diaspora network in the destination country. This explains why migration restrictions are likely more effective for origin countries that already have a large or cohesive diaspora at the destination, and why short-term policy interventions such as 'information campaigns' in origin regions tend to be largely ineffective in deterring future migration, as migrants are usually already well informed about the risks involved in migrating.

4 The limited margin of maneuver of policy interventions

The EU and its member states have developed policy tools to 'address the root causes of migration' and to shape migration patterns, seeking to attract migrants with particular skills and deter unwanted refugee and irregular arrivals. While public and media attention focuses largely on irregular migrants and asylum seekers, the vast majority of the roughly 2.4 million migrants who come to Europe every year does so regularly. With the exception of 2015, around 90 percent of migration over the past decade has occurred within the policy frameworks developed by the EU and member states. Research points at three key dynamics that are often overlooked in policy debates but that could further improve migration policy effectiveness.

First, although migration policies inevitably trigger unexpected consequences to a certain extent, certain well-studied dynamics could be avoided by taking on board lessons from the past. In particular, research on African migration to Europe and Mexican migration to the US has shown that entry restrictions tend to increase irregular migration and migrants' propensity to settle down permanently at the destination. Although official entry numbers might decrease in response to restrictions, ultimately the number of immigrants

settled at the destination increases over time as a result of declining returns. Similarly, the mere announcement of future restrictions can have the counter-productive effect of triggering a 'now-or-never' migration, i.e. immigration spikes just before migration restrictions are introduced. In contrast, migration levels between non-restricted migration corridors (such as within the EU or other free mobility areas) are generally low and fluctuate according to the economic situation. Also, migrants with permanent residency or dual citizenship are usually among the most mobile and prone to return home.

Second, migration policy effectiveness could be increased by better aligning migration policy goals with the objectives of other policy areas, in particular development, trade, labor market, education or foreign policy. Migration policy interventions that fundamentally go against goals pursued by EU and member states' in other policy areas are bound to fail. This explains why labor migration restrictions are usually effective in times of economic recession, while they tend to spur irregular migration and employment in a context of economic growth or when nationals are not willing or able to fill the jobs at the bottom of the labor market. Similarly, tighter border controls tend to push migrants to adopt riskier, costlier, and deadlier routes from which smugglers and other intermediaries profit, with potentially minimal effects on reducing actual irregular entries. And the other way around, a policy to attract high-skilled migrants will be most effective if national education systems provide attractive options for their children and if the labor market offers opportunities for spouses. Similarly, policies attracting international students will be most successful if they allow students to transition into the labor market upon graduation. In the international race for talent, these considerations will increasingly play a role.

Third, migration always involves at least two - and often many - states. Research indicates that when elaborating policy interventions that seek to shape migration, the driver environment in origin countries as well as the migration-related interests of origin countries are not always taken into account. For example, in the case of migration partnerships, the interests of partner countries tend to be integrated too late in the policymaking process. The same goes for negotiations on return and readmission. Furthermore, policies should take into account the driver environment in origin countries, as migration policies. Ultimately, migration policies that go against structural migration drivers in origin and destination countries are unlikely to affect absolute migration volumes. However, they can importantly shape the features of international migration – who migrates when, how and where to. This could maximize migration benefits for destination and origin countries, as well as migrants themselves.

Ten key lessons

To conclude, here are ten key research insights that might inspire future reflections when developing, implementing or evaluating policies seeking to shape migration drivers:

- Migration policies are largely effective when shifting the political gaze away from irregular migration and considering the entire migration system;
- War and poverty cannot explain global migration patterns, as migration is a response to particular driver configurations, such as the match between educational and occupational opportunities or the interplay between economic inequality and environmental degradation;
- Migration corridors wax and wane, as people constantly update the mental 'world maps' that guide their migration decisions, suggesting that current migration dynamics and corridors are not set in stone but will adapt to future developments around the globe;
- Migration aspirations are not a reliable indicator for future migration, particularly in contexts of political volatility and high economic constraints;
- Policy interventions affect different migrant groups very differently, inviting policymakers to move away from one-size-fits-all approaches and taylor policies to the targeted migrant groups;
- Migration restrictions tend to decrease circularity between origin and destination and to push migrants into permanent settlement, while free mobility regimes allow migration patterns to rapidly adjust to changes in structural driver constellations or individual circumstances;
- When designing and evaluating migration policies, it is imperative to consider the entire migratory process (including arrival and return, short- and long-term consequences);
- Migration policy interventions will more be more effective in shaping immigration patterns when their goals are aligned with those of other policy fields, particularly trade, foreign or labor market policies;
- Integrating origin countries' interests on migration into reflections on immigration policy is vital for successful international migration cooperation;
- Rather than affecting absolute migration volumes, migration policies allow to actively shape the characteristics of and conditions under which migration occurs, i.e. who migrates when, how and where to.

Main EU policy frameworks on migration drivers

- Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (2014-2020)
- European Agenda on Migration (May 2015)
- Joint Valetta Action Plan (November 2015)

- Partnership Framework on Migration (June 2016)
- New European Consensus on Development (2017)

Recommended readings

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* Top 3 key readings

WP5
Key Knowledge Questions on Migration **Infrastructures**

Definition and Conceptualisation of Migration Infrastructures

Most migration research is taking a receiving country perspective that is post hoc, hence after migration has already occurred. Less attention is paid to the processes between the decision to migrate is made and the arrival in a receiving country. The concept of migration infrastructures sheds light on migration processes and analyses how people migrate. Migration infrastructures can be defined as an ensemble of actors and structures that facilitate migration. More precisely, the concept consists of the following five dimensions:

- regular and irregular actors and structures,
- state, quasi-state and non-state actors,
- commercial and non-commercial actors and structures,
- material, architectural, technical and digital infrastructures,
- practices of and experiences with these infrastructures, including issues such as exploitation or crime.

This implies that migration infrastructures are multidimensional as they consist of persons and materials, nature and technology, structure and agency, and knowledge (verbal or written and more or less publicly available). These multiple dimensions are the conditions under which people migrate and travel, the material resources and knowledge required to complete a journey, the organisations, businesses, or platforms that hold resources and provide information or services with regards to migration and the individuals who populate these.

Migration infrastructures represent an important element of the opportunity structure that shapes peoples' capability to migrate. It acknowledges the challenges of travel and migration including natural features (distance, natural obstacles such as rivers, mountains, deserts and the sea) and political constraints (borders, bureaucratic requirements and control agencies). It sheds light on the actors and structures that help to navigate the given conditions and acknowledges the complex and dynamic processes between them. The concept does not include the infrastructures that seek to impede migration such as systems of border control or racialized visa regimes. However, infrastructures can shape who migrates or who is excluded from migration, for example through pricing schemes, where individuals migrate, or how they migrate.

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The key research questions in the study of migration infrastructures include the following:

- How do people migrate?
- Who and what facilitates the migration of people?
- What do facilitators do? Which characteristics do they have?
- How do migrants interact with and use infrastructures?
- How do migrants experience infrastructures?

Migration infrastructures is a relatively new concept that has only been introduced around the early 2010s (Lindquist, Xiang & Yeoh 2012). However, the study of its individual elements dates back at least to the early 2000s and is based on the 'mobility turn' in social sciences, a paradigm shift towards more scholarly attention on the systematic movement of people (Sheller & Urry 2006).

There are various similar but slightly divergent concepts, notably migration industries, migration networks and migration drivers. The concept of migration infrastructures is partly different from the migration industries in that it also includes non-commercial actors but does not cover actors primarily controlling and/or preventing migration. In addition, migration infrastructure is different from migration networks in that it does not cover inter-personal and social but only organised structures. Personal networks can become part of migration infrastructures, for instance, when former migrants provide information or advice on digital platforms, acting as intermediaries or running migration businesses. Meanwhile, there is a certain overlap between migration infrastructures and migration drivers in that actors providing information or services in person or on digital platforms may incentivise prospective migrants.

Overall, migration infrastructures refer to the meso-level of migration processes linking macro-level conditions (demography, economics, policies or climate) and micro-level factors (migrant characteristics, cognitive processes, individual decision-making). In general, the concept relates to the processes between departure and arrival (see Crawley et al. 2016); in the future, migration infrastructures could be complemented by integration infrastructures.

Why the topic matters

The concept of migration infrastructures recognises that migration pathways cannot be described as a line connecting two places but that they are complex, multi-faceted spaces of mediation. They include a vast range of actors and structures such as visa brokers, recruitment agencies for workers and students, marriage agencies, travel agencies, providers of pre-departure health screenings, human smugglers as well as carriers, routes, roads, hubs, bus and train stations, (air)ports, hotels or safe houses and digital platforms. Access to migration infrastructures – and knowing how to navigate them - is an important resource determining individuals' opportunities to travel and/or migrate. Without the mentioned infrastructures in place, migration would not be possible. Acquiring and drawing on knowledge on the linkages and dynamics playing out within and between the sending, transit and receiving context is essential in order to inform effective policymaking on migration, both at home and abroad.

Several types of migration infrastructures have begun to feature prominently in policy debates on migration. This includes the role of human smugglers and traffickers who facilitate migration with and without an individual's consent, respectively, when crossing the Sahara Desert or the Mediterranean Sea. Yet, as previous research on migration infrastructures has shown, the attention paid to smugglers and smuggling networks appears to be somewhat disproportionate as these actors or infrastructures only account for less than one per cent of all migration. Indeed, a vast majority of people on the move avail themselves of regular migration channels. Such regular immigration infrastructures are, however, sometimes used to enter and overstay, for example by people working in breach of their visa requirements. Even though they may facilitate irregular immigration, regular features, structures and types of migration remain partly overseen in the public and political debate.

State of the Art

The concept of migration infrastructures provides answers to five main questions. Three out of these will be discussed in the following and should be considered when designing migration policies.

1 Which intermediaries and services do migrants rely on?

As mentioned above, research concerned with human smuggling and trafficking is relatively broad focusing on routes, modalities, business models and migrant experiences (e.g. Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). However, organisations or businesses enabling migrants to leave their countries are much more diverse. Intermediary services range from facilitating student mobility and marriage migration to labour recruitment or visa brokerage.

Migration Infrastructures
How do people migrate?

Aspects

- Intermediaries, brokers, agents, and other actors
- Logistics and means of transportation
- Routes, (transit) hubs and sites of migration
- Digital infrastructures
- Tourism and Migration

Main Questions

- Which intermediaries and services do migrants rely on?
- Which means of transportation do they use?
- Which routes, hubs and sites do they frequent?
- How do tourism and migration intersect?
- To what extent do digital infrastructures facilitate migration?

Cranston's (2018) work on high skilled migration to Singapore or Thieme's study (2017) on student mobility agents in Nepal are only two examples that illustrate the variety of actors in the field.

Empirical evidence indicates that it is difficult to clearly distinguish between regular and irregular actors and practices. Instead, actors often find themselves in a semi-regular space where they provide different services according to their clients' needs, current visa requirements and immigration policies. Alpes' (2017) study on agencies and intermediaries offering both irregular and regular migration services reveals the sometimes hybrid spaces between legality and illegality.

Whilst smugglers are often depicted as immoral and exploitative in media and policy discourses, research suggests that the relationship between smugglers and migrants is more complex and can also be based on solidarity, and moral or religious duty (see Achilli 2018). Another distinction that is blurred in the public discourse is that between human smugglers and traffickers. While human smugglers by definition act in consensus with migrants, traffickers usually use violence, deception or coercion. Many scholars, politicians and journalists are not aware of this differentiation which leads to a general suspicion against smugglers and middlemen, many of which might be even perceived as heroes by their clients (Belloni and Jeffrey 2014).
These aspects show that it is necessary to avoid simplifications and gain a nuanced understanding of the actors in the field. In order to design migration policies efficiently, it is important to take into account that there is a variety

of actors active in migration mediation that are not limited to smugglers and traffickers. Likewise, there are many private actors who may find themselves in semi-regular spaces providing services that are influenced by and adapted to immigration policies and entry requirements.

2 Which means of transportation and logistics do migrants utilise?

The public discourse on migration is often dominated by boat arrivals on the coasts of Greece, Italy or Spain. Meanwhile, conventional migration and the means of transportation and logistics used has been almost entirely overseen. However, as previous research indicates, many migrants rely on low cost carriers such as budget flights, long-distance coaches or trains and use shuttle services, public transportation or taxi services in order to reach airports and stations (Teunissen 2018; Hirsh 2017). The emergence of relatively cheap flights has led to frequent back-and-forth travel between source and destination countries, notably of labour migrants travelling between Eastern and Western European countries. Exploring this overlap between migration and tourism logistics is crucial to understand the variety of migration routes to Europe which are far from being limited to boat crossings of the Mediterranean. These different regular and irregular migratory pathways need to be kept in mind, notably when seeking to manage entries into the European Union.

3 To what extent do digital infrastructures facilitate migration?

The majority of migrants travelling to Europe, as research on migration infrastructures suggests, rely on digital technologies. Refugees use smartphones and other devices to seek information and contact peers, smugglers and loved ones via phone calls, social media or SMS. GPS tools helping migrants to navigate also play a crucial role. Empirical evidence shows, for example, that the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) significantly reduces migrants' dependency on migration intermediaries including human smugglers (see Alencar et al. 2018).

However, the use of these technologies also bears risks and challenges. Many migrants indicate that it is often difficult to verify information provided online. As refugees find themselves in a particularly vulnerable position, relying on false information can cause serious harm or even death (see Borkert et al. 2018). Many migrants prefer to rely on information given by people they know personally or by government actors (see Dekker et al. 2018). In addition, connectivity is not always available during flight (UNHCR 2016). Network coverage and electricity to charge batteries are sometimes not available. Phones and mobile data can be relatively expensive for people on the move without a regular income. Besides this, crossing several borders during the journey often makes it necessary to buy new SIM cards and recharge one's phone credit in every single country. These

obstacles result in an increased dependency on smugglers and the risk to fall in the hands of human traffickers (Latonero and Kift 2018).

In terms of policy implications, literature suggests that humanitarian services for displaced persons should not be limited to food and shelter but include digital connectivity services such as charging stations, free cyber cafés or WIFI spots along migration routes (Gillespie 2018). Besides this, access to reliable information in the form of online campaigns provided on channels that are trustworthy and well-known to migrants, notably also Facebook and WhatsApp, can prevent migrants from harm and abuse (Borkert et al. 2018). As research by Mason and Buchmann (2016) on the island of Lesbos suggests, forced migrants tend to use social media and communication apps rather than webpages, often lacking the knowledge on how to access them. Oeppen's (2016) article on German campaigns seeking to prevent Afghans from migrating underlines that campaigns are not likely to be believed by migrants if they are perceived as biased and will be ignored particularly by those fleeing from war and terror.

4 Main research gaps

Research on migration infrastructures allows policymakers to gain a more holistic understanding of migratory pathways and devise migration policies taking into consideration actors, structures and logistics on the ground. So far, migration infrastructures is a rather fragmented field. Research is hugely imbalanced in that some issues have received scholarly attention whereas others are almost completely absent. It is crucial to fill knowledge gaps in order to genuinely understand migratory pathways and design evidence-based migration policies that efficiently impact pathways and protect migrants from harm.

First, notably in the European context, several studies address migration industries, i.e. the commercial aspects of facilitating migration. However, this research does not specifically take into account broader migration facilitation infrastructures in which such commercial activities are embedded. In terms of geographic focus areas, research on Asia is comparably more advanced than research of other regions. Second, there is a strong focus on human smugglers and traffickers, and to some extent also on sites and routes of what is denoted as transit migration. There is, however, less research on regular agents such as work recruitment agencies, student mobility consultants or marriage agents. Third, while digital migration studies are an emerging field of interest, unequal access to resources and the so-called digital divide as determined by class, gender, age and country of origin remain under-researched areas. And finally, as mentioned above, there is little research on the interface of migration and tourism or travel logistics. Notably, means of transportation, such as carriers, (air)ports or bus and train stations are so far widely neglected in migration

research, yet they play a role in terms of mobility patterns of people migrating to the European Union or elsewhere. A key obstacle is the predominantly containerised thinking in the different fields related to mobility. We would recommend improving exchange and mutual learning between research fields such as transport economics, tourism studies, logistics or legal studies.

References to the main EU policy frameworks

There are very few EU or indeed international policy frameworks addressing aspects of migration infrastructures. So far, the main focus lies on human smuggling, human trafficking, the responsibilities of carriers and the tourism industry more broadly. There is an inherent tension between the objectives of these four policy areas, which has become evident in research on migration infrastructures. While certain privileged kinds of movement like tourism and cheap airfare have become more affordable and available to some people, others are excluded from this type of mobility and face a regime of increased security, control and immobilisation.

The main EU policy frameworks are:

- Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, short Carrier Sanctions Directive;
- EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 - 2020), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 27 May 2015, COM(2015) 285 final;
- Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, short human trafficking directive;
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Europe, the world's No 1 tourist destination – a new political framework for tourism in Europe, COM/2010/0352 final.

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WP6
Key Knowledge Questions on Migration **Flows & Forms**

Migration Flows
What are the profiles of migrants arriving in Europe?

Policymakers need data and analysis on the profiles of newcomers to design adequate migration, asylum and integration policies.

- Where do newcomers in Europe come from, and what are their socioeconomic characteristics?
- How do their profiles differ based on how they reached Europe?
- How can we explain changes in the profiles of migrants and refugees over time?

1. What data is available on migration flows?
2. What are the categories used by actors at EU, national and local level to define migration flows to Europe?
3. What are the effects of EU policies on the nature of these flows?

Policy relevance of migration flows and forms

Europe faces a number of societal challenges, such as technological development and increased automatisation and robotisation changing the nature of work, population ageing and lower birth rates impacting the care and welfare systems, or challenges of sustainable economic growth in the context of climate crisis (Gonzalez Vazquez et al. 2019; Luyten et al. 2019). Although international immigration is interwoven with these issues, it is not a ready answer to solve them and may instead increase existing anxieties stemming from employment restructuring and welfare security.

In last two decades, the EU has moved forward in developing a common migration agenda and more harmonised migration and asylum policies (see Table 1 below). However, rules and standards for non-humanitarian migration are still not fully harmonised. Migration policy toward third country nationals (TCNs) is a 'shared competence/power' of the EU, meaning that member states can develop their own policies in parallel to the EU common policy. Similarly,

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the EU Qualification Directive (part of the Common European Asylum System) has not fully harmonised the asylum-granting procedures across member states yet. It leaves space for interpretation and procedural differences across states, resulting in different outcomes for the same nationalities in different EU states (Beirens 2018). This makes data on migration flows to Europe hard to compare between member states – especially when looking at reasons of admission, as discussed later.

During the 'refugee emergency' of 2015-2016, the EU was criticised for its lack of coordinated policymaking and a long-term vision on future of EU migration policy. This is partially the result of some member states' resistance to unifying migration policies. The diversity in approaches to migration policy and ways of recording migration is further complicated by its separation from intra-EU mobility. While EU migration policy focuses on external migration flows to EU/EFTA countries, additional imbalances and implications for cohesive and harmonious development (in terms of welfare provision and demographic make-up) are brought by immigration from less wealthy EU countries to more prosperous regions.

Currently, 4.5% of European population are non-EU nationals and in the last years approx. 3 mln newcomers have been arriving to EU/EFTA counties annually. The question who migrants arriving to Europe are is pivotal in order to design balanced welfare systems or decide on appropriate labour market priorities across Europe. How old are incoming migrants, would they work, if yes, what skills and resources do they bring, and finally, what are their plans – to settle or to stay temporarily? This policy brief discusses European data sources designed to monitor migration flows and reflects what we can actually say about profiles of migrants arriving in Europe.

Difficulty in measuring migration flows

Flows vs Stocks

Migration flows are not easy to measure or describe. Most data sources on international migration produce statistics on migration stocks (the number of immigrants living in a country at a certain point of time) rather than flows

(the number of people leaving/entering over the course of a specific period, usually a year), (OECD 2018; UN DESA 2017).

Due to the lack of data on 'real' migration flows, social scientists have come up with ways of estimating them on the basis of migration stock data, after correcting for differences in migration definitions as well as missing data (Abel, Sander 2014; Wiśniowski et al 2013). Past projects, such as THESIM (Towards Harmonised European Statistics on International Migration, 2004-2005), IMEM (The Integrated Modelling of European Migration, 2002-2008) or MIMOSA (Migration Modelling for Statistical Analyses, 2002-2007[1]), re-estimated migration flows across European countries.

Other techniques have also been considered and tested. A study by Statistics Netherlands, funded by European Space Agency, tried to forecast migration flows by monitoring the size and movements of people around refugee camps, based on satellite images and social media. Another study demonstrated that analysing Google Trends indices, which show the number of online searches for specific keywords in migrants' countries of origin, can help in estimating migration flows (Böhme et al. 2019). Yet, these new methodological developments are mainly concerned with the intensity of flows, and they offer little insight into the profile of migrants.

Data sources

People who move to a country other than their usual residence for a period of at least 12 months are considered 'migrants' within major international data sources (e.g. OECD, UN). They usually break data by nationality, place of previous residence, age and sex. As such, they do not allow to describe the socioeconomic profiles of migrants, or they do not capture short-term movements and migratory forms such as temporary or circular migration.
EU surveys, which have a battery of questions about immigrants' socio-demographic profile – such as EU Labour Force Surveys (EU-LFS) or EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) – do not systematically include representative samples of immigrants. Some other European data sources and their limitations are overviewed in Table 2.

European datasets for population and immigration draw on national registers, which record more socio-demographic and economic information about migrants and country's population as a whole. They do not separate more recent newcomers from settled migrants.

[1] http://research.icmpd.org/projects/migration-statistics/thesim/; http://www.imem.cpc.ac.uk/; http://mimosa.cytise.be/

An example of good practice is a Nordic Central Population Register (CPR), shared between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Each resident is assigned a Personal Identification Number (PIN), either at birth or on immigration to a country. The PIN number follows individual through their lives and when moving to another Nordic country (Hovde Lyngstad, Skardhamar 2011). On the one hand, CPR register data is not perfect in terms of comparability, long processing time, and still requires caution when retrieving data on education or income outcomes (Van Der Wel et al. 2019). On the other hand, migratory pathways of both European and non-European migrants might be traced across Nordic countries, as well as their corresponding change in profile.

Table 1
Key EU migration policy development aiming to harmonise policies

Year	Policy	Measures
1999	Amsterdam Treaty & Tampere Council	With the Treaty (May), Member States transferred more legislative power on immigration and asylum to EU institutions; Tampere Council (October) called to develop common EU policies on asylum and immigration
2005	EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)	The framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy, which involved implementing multiple political and legal instruments (e.g. Mobility Partnerships)
2010	The Common European Asylum System (CEAS)	Legislative framework aiming to harmonise procedures and protection statuses across member states, marks a major step in the EU approach to humanitarian migration (including the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive, the Dublin Regulation, and the EURODAC regulation)
2015	European Agenda on Migration (EAM)	Measures aimed at securing external borders, limiting irregular migration, modernising the Common European Asylum System, and effectively managing legal migration

EthMigSurveyData is a COST action project (see https://ethmigsurveydatahub.eu/) aiming to develop a harmonised survey data bank with surveys of ethnic minorities and migrants across Europe. Although the 'post-harmonised' dataset will produce more reliable data on integration of ethnic minorities and migrants (so again with a focus on the 'stocks' not 'flows'). It might be worth further research whether there is a potential to build a representative subsample of more recent migrants to learn about their profiles. It is, however, likely that in many countries newcomers arriving to Europe fall outside used sampling frames for these surveys and they might not be included in harmonised data anyway.

Migration flows to Europe

What does data tell us?

Despite the 'refugee emergency' of 2015-2016 monopolised the media's attention in recent years, the main forms of immigration in the past two years have been for the purpose of undertaking work and for family reasons. As depicted in the map in Figure 2, migration flows differ considerably across Member States and parts of Europe. While the most common form of migration in Western and Southern EU countries in 2018 were family and humanitarian migration, Eastern European countries – due to smaller settled migrant communities – experienced a sharper increase in work-related migration.

Poland – thanks to the special scheme for temporary workers (see next section) – is a recent frontrunner in labour migration, with the number growing by six times between 2012 and 2017 – from approx. 100 thousand to almost 600 thousand. Among the 1 mln permits issued for work purposes in 2017 across the EU, almost 60% were issued in Poland. This fell to 37% (328 thousand) in 2018. Ukrainians predominantly migrate to Poland on the basis of temporary work permits, 80% of which were issued for low-skilled jobs in 2017. Other main destinations of labour migration in Europe in 2018 were the UK, Germany, Spain and France.

Family migration is the most important reason among all migrants holding a permit in Europe. The largest number of permits for family reasons was issued in 2018 in Germany, Spain, Italy, UK, France and Spain – so-called 'traditional' countries of immigration in Europe. In the last five years, 'family migration' more than doubled in Germany from 82,000 to 190,000, while the highest relative increase was recorded in Poland – from 3.5 thousand permits to 13 thousand.

[2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/methodology

[3] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/migr_immi_esms.htm

In 2013-2015 most applications for humanitarian protection were lodged in Germany, Hungary, Sweden and Italy. More recently, growing numbers of asylum seekers have submitted applications in Greece and Spain. The main countries of origin of applicants in recent years were Syria (22% of appl. in 2014-2018), Afghanistan (11%), Iraq (8%), Pakistan (4%) and Georgia (1%).

A decade ago (2009) the four main origins of immigrants were Indian, American, Chinese and Moroccan. In last few years, Ukraine has become the main country of origin of immigrants to Europe. Immigration from China has also increased due to more education-related stays. Both sources of immigration are rather temporary, and many immigrants return to their countries of origin without settling in.

Table 2
Overview of European data sources on immigration flows in Europe

Data source	How produced	Limitations
Eurostat 'Asylum & Managed Migration' [2]	Data collected by EU/ EFTA data providers: mainly Ministries of Interior or related immigration agencies	• Differences in permits issued across MS • Different level of implementation of EU directives • No socioeconomic profile
Eurostat Immigration Statistics [3]	National statistics institutes: Central/ National population registers, Censuses or population estimates	• Migration defined as 12-month stay (actual or expected, varies by country) • Migration stocks data • Population by country of birth and citizenship (EU/non-EU) and employment, educational attainment
Eurostat Population Statistics	As above LFS Surveys	• Population employment, educational attainment etc. by country of birth and citizenship (EU/non-EU) • Migration stocks data
Frontex detection of illegal border crossings	Data supplied by EU/ EFTA member states (MS)	• The same person may cross EU/EFTA external border more than once • No socio-demographic data
EU Surveys (EU-SILC, EU-LFS)	Sample surveys	• Surveys not representative for migrant populations

Figure 2
Fist permits issued in EU28 and EFTA by reason in 2018* (% of total for a country)



Source Eurostat 2018 [migr_fas]. * Data for Switzerland for 2017.

What we would like to know

Political regulations influence how immigrants arriving to Europe are classified. The administrative categories to qualify the situation of migrants in Europe are based on: (a) legality of entrance and stay (according to the EU and national laws) and (b) one main reason to migrate to a country. Consequently, Eurostat's 'Asylum & Managed Migration' gathers data on migration flows as fixed and static migratory categories. In this data various types of migration flows are separated on the based on their purposes, such as work, educational, family reasons, or 'other reasons' (which includes asylum)[4]. Such categories have far-reaching practical consequences: they give (or deny) access to certain resources and protection rights (Erdal, Oeppen 2018).

Meanwhile the lines between migratory forms are blurred. The permit type might not necessary correspond well with the actual and more complex motive to move. Migration for reasons to seek protection or unite with family members, for example, does not exclude holding work-related reasons too. The term 'mixed migration', coined a few decades ago and nowadays commonly used by UNHCR (Scheel, Ratfisch 2014), attempts to represent the complex motives and nature of migration spanning between 'voluntary' and 'forced' motives. Yet, it has not been translated into administrative categories (see Box 1).

Box 1
Categories used to describe migration flows

The main category of EU and national migration policies is **third country nationals** (TCNs) – people who are not citizens of any EU member state nor of an EFTA country (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland), and do not have the right to the freedom of movement within the EU[5]. In the EU legal framework, citizens of EU and EFTA countries who move within EU/EFTA are not migrants, but 'mobile' citizens. Despite that, in many European countries, the public still regards them as **migrants**. This is especially true for certain minorities, for example Roma people (Yildiz, De Genova 2018) or citizens from newer EU member states. In popular use, the term 'migrant' is often reserved to migrants from countries regarded as less wealthy or more culturally distant, while migrants from Western countries (like Western European states, US) are characterised as 'expats' (Cranston 2017). Although their mobility type is technically a form of migration (and often long-term or permanent), their presence is seen as desirable, and position in opposition to other 'migrants' who might be less desired.

The term **refugee** is also used in different ways. In the light of international law, 'asylum seekers' are distinguished from 'refugees' as humanitarian migrants whose claims have not been yet evaluated. In common understanding, only persons forced to flee their country due to persecution, war or violence are considered 'real' refugees by definition. Fixed categorisations do not reflect the complex reality of migrants' lives, whose status between 'forced' and 'voluntary' migration is usually not clear-cut. Migrants' motivations are often mixed, including both humanitarian and economic reasons (Robertson 2019). Some asylum seekers (and people self-identifying as refugees) might be leaving their countries as a result of economic reasons too, for example, since some professions might become forbidden due to new regimes, e.g. in Islamic-State controlled territories: barbers, photocopying, gynaecologist (Crawley, Skleparis 2018).

[4] The 'other reasons' category includes: humanitarian migration; diplomat, consular officer treated as exempt from control; retired persons of independent means; all other passengers given limited leave to enter who are not included in any other category; non-asylum discretionary permissions.

[5] While in the legal definition citizens of NO, IS, LI and CH are not TNC, in some migration statistics they are considered to be TNC, along nationals of European micro-states (Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City). See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/third-country-national_en

Box 2
Measuring policy impacts on migration – an impossible task?

To evaluate the effect of migration policy on migratory flows, it is necessary to establish: what counts as migration policy; what is the intended aim of policy change; and how the policy change is managed and communicated (Haas et al. 2015). Specifically:

- Migration policy may include: border control policies, labour migration policies, asylum policies, family reunification policy, integration policy, etc.
- Relevant policy tools can be: recruitment programmes, new work/residency permits, easier access to citizenship, new detention rules, or resettlement programmes.
- Effect of non-migration policies: development and aid programmes, national labour market policies (e.g. more flexible modes of employment), education policies.
- Changes of policy might be: restricting/expanding the volume and composition (profile) any migrants / specific group of migrants (origin).
- The real objectives of a new policy might be affected and even distorted by the discourse surrounding the policy change.

The socio-economic profile of migrants moving to Europe often changes drastically during their journey too. They might leave their country of origin with financial resources necessary to bring their families to a safe location, but arrive to a country of transit or destination without any resources left, and in a need of protection. Also, we do not know what permits immigrants apply for after the temporary humanitarian statuses expire[6]. To move away from such static and binary categories, Collyer and Haas (2012: 479) suggested a term 'fragmented migration', so migration could be conceptualised as a "process in which people shift from one categorisation to another". While such changes may be potentially traced at the national levels (i.e. via population registers), Eurostat data does not unpack changes in migration forms over time.

Despite these problems regarding the oversimplifying nature of used migration categories, policymakers still need some reference categories to effectively manage migration flows and to coordinate immigration policies across the EU. Recording more information on migration motive and migrant profiles, as well as their change over time and space (while they move within EU/EFTA and apply for different permits), would allow better understanding who migrants arriving to Europe are.

Figure 3
Monthly arrivals of migrants to Greece, Italy and Spain (January 2016 – May 2019)



Source www.data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/Mediterranean

Policy changes and migration flows/forms

Limiting irregular migration

During the last 'refugee emergency' in Europe (2015-2016), EU and member countries separately have made steps to decrease the number of irregular migrants arriving to Europe. Figure 6 illustrates that in a long-term perspective (2009-2018) Eastern and Central Mediterranean migration routes have been most frequently used to cross the external EU borders unlawfully. While the intensity of migration flows can be explored, not much can be concluded at the European level about the characteristics of newcomers due to data nature.

- Shortly after signing the EU-Turkey Agreement in March 2016, accompanied by closing of North Macedonia borders, the number of irregular migration has dropped significantly in Greece (see Figure 3). However, the number of asylum seekers arriving to Greece has not fallen, although it has been rising less dynamically.

[6] Asylum seekers who do not qualify for refugee status (Geneva Convention) or subsidiary protection (would face real risk of serious harm in case of return to country of origin) might receive temporary protection (in case of large influx of migrants). In some countries they are also allowed to stay for other humanitarian reasons (usually ill health or as unaccompanied minors).

Figure 4
Monthly detection of illegal border crossings (January 2009 – July 2019)



Source Frontex, FRAN data, 7th October 2019

- Similarly, the Italy-Libya Agreement of July 2017 significantly diminished the inflow of migrants from Libya. At the same time Spain has become a more important immigration route: the number of asylum seekers has tripled in 2018 in comparison to 2016 (increase from 16 thousand to 54 thousand) and the number of irregular crossings reached 10 thousand per month in summer 2018, falling to 1 thousand in March 2019.
- Within the Schengen area there was a number of temporary border controls was introduced to counter secondary movements of irregular migrants. For example, Sweden introduced border controls at the border with Denmark (Nov 2015-May 2017) and Denmark introduced such controls at its border with Germany (since Jan 2016). Other European countries, such as North Macedonia, Greece or Hungary temporarily closed their borders in this time.

It is hard to assess the independent effect of EU migration management efforts on changing flows. Pointing to the lack of reliable data, recent policy analysis calls into question whether the drop in the migration flows via the Western Balkan Route was actually the result of the EU-Turkey agreement (Engler 2019). There are also reservations towards the 'shift in routes' hypothesis, as a few migrants from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq have arrived via Italy and the Central Mediterranean Route.

Managing forms of migration

Family migration

Not all EU countries are bound by the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC; UK, Ireland and Denmark) and in some countries it is implemented differently (e.g. who can be a sponsor, sponsor type of permit, definition of family members and other dependant persons). For example, Poland – with a relatively small community of settled and long-term immigrates – does not allow to unite within partner (non-marriage) relationships, as do Portugal, Denmark and UK.

As a result, as depicted in Figure 5, the extent to which residence permits for family reasons are used varies across countries. After an increase in humanitarian migration in Sweden in 2015-2016, followed by more migration because of family reasons, the number of such applications became stable in 2017-2018 (Figure 7, graph g), which might be due to reforms in law (as discussed below).

Humanitarian migration

Sweden used to have one of the most generous asylum laws in the EU. In June 2016, in response to the increase in inflow of asylum seekers in 2015-2016, Sweden introduced more restrictive asylum law by reducing access to family reunification for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Frantzke 2017). Specifically, refugees had to submit reunification claims within three months of receiving the status and after demonstrating financial sufficiency. The beneficiaries of subsidiary protection became no longer eligible to apply for family reunification as they were not granted permanent residency anymore, but temporary residency. Additionally, the status 'otherwise in need of protection' was not granted anymore.

Highly skilled work migration

The EU Blue Card (BC) initiative is a relatively new work permit for highly qualified workers introduced by the European Commission in 2007, and implemented from 2009. The Card – as any other migration policy initiative in the EU – has been implemented differently across member states. Although only UK, Ireland and Denmark opted out from the scheme, yet

Box 3
Poland: from temporary to permanent migration

In 2007, Poland introduced a new employment status for selected groups of foreigners called 'declarations of intent to employ', also called 'simplified procedure'. Citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia could undertake temporary employment in Poland without proper work permits: it was sufficient that an employer registered in a local job centre their intent to employ them. Currently, the law covers all EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) and refers to any work which is temporary, but not seasonal, and for up to six months in a 12-month period. In 2018, a new seasonal work permit was also introduced and available to foreigners to any nationality to undertake work for up to nine month per year (Jaroszewicz 2018).

The effect of these policy changes has been widespread. The number of declarations has been increasing, especially since 2014, from 387 thousand to 1.8 mln in 2017. In 2017, 95% of the declarations were for Ukrainian citizens, out of which 35% were issued to foreigners who already had a visa or residence permit in Poland. The number of other permits has been affected too – work permits increased from 41 thousand in 2013 to 267 thousand in 2017 (Ukrainians: increase from 21 thousand to 216 thousand), as well as more foreigners has been applying for residence permits: while in 2014 it was 80 thousand, in 2017 it more than doubled to – 192 thousand (of whom 65% were Ukrainians).

it is not used in practice in majority of EU countries. In 2017, out of 24 thousand cards, 21 thousand were issued by Germany. The number of cards issued in Germany has increased since 2012 ten times from 2.6 thousand to 27 in 2018[7].

The tool has not been yet successful in attracting more qualified migrants due to a number of issues. First, many Member States have their own national schemes for highly skilled that are more generous or more easily accessible, e.g. in terms of processing time, pathways to permanent residency and salary threshold (Triandafyllidou, Isaakyan 2014). Second, BC offers limited possibilities to TNC to move within a European labour market. Finally, the salary threshold (1.2 the average salary in the member state for a profession in shortage, and 1.5 – any other skilled profession), might be too high for workers at early career stages.

Low skilled and skilled migration

The countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have experienced unprecedented level of emigration of their own citizens to Western Europe countries. As such, their labour markets struggle to fill in posts with low-skilled workers and semi-skilled specialists. Poland has been in recent year the largest recipient of temporary migration from Ukraine and other Eastern Europe non-EU countries (see case study in Box 3). Polish case demonstrates how the effect of policy aiming to support temporary and seasonal employment (directed to low-skilled employees) can spread across other forms of migration, resulting in more permanent forms of immigration. Similarly, in 2017-2018 Hungary has been issuing more work permits and more migrants have used family unification route to move to the country. Ukrainians also the largest migration group in Hungary (21 thousand work-related permits), followed by Serbs (3.4 thousand).

Germany has introduced a new policy called Western Balkan Regulation (2015), aiming at reducing irregular and asylum applications from Western Balkans and 're-routing' them into a legal pathway. The access to German labour market for citizens of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia was liberalised (no skill/qualification requirements). In 2016-2017 over 117 thousand valid work contracts were issued, and the country recorded 90% drop of asylum applications. Yet, in this time many other measures on stopping immigrants from the region were undertaken, so the effects of this policy cannot be fully established (Bither, Ziebarth 2018).

Study migration

Almost one in third migration permits for the purpose of study was granted in the UK in 2018. The popularity of the British higher education has however declined in last decade after the higher education reform (from 270 thousand permits in 2009 to 190 thousand in 2018; especially since 2012/2013 – increase of university fees to 9 thousand GDP per annum).

The second recipient of international students in 2018 was Poland which issued almost 100 thousand permits for education reasons. It was three times more than it did annually in years 2014-2017[8]. A few factors contribute to the popularity of Poland among international students: internationalisation

[7] Germany Skilled Worker Immigration Act (passed by German parliament on 7 June 2019, which will enter into force in March 2020) facilitates work migration of people with higher education and qualified professionals with vocational qualifications from outside EU/EFTA countries. This would replace the list with shortage of occupations (Beirens et al. 2019).

[8] In 2018, 55 thousand permits were for Ukrainian students, 11 thousand – Turkish, 5 thousand for Indian and Belarussian each.

Figure 5
First permits by reason in 2009-2018 in selected EU countries



Source Eurostat 2018 [migr_fas]

programme of Polish higher education (the programme „Study in Poland" kicked off in 2005), scholarships programmes for students with Polish descend, globally recognised standards of some disciplines (such as in science and medicine), obtaining an EU-recognised degree while studying in a country of relatively low life costs in comparison to Western Europe.

Summary

The above overview of changes testifies to difficulty in predicting migration flows and how particular migratory forms have been affected. The intensity, composition and the direction of migration flows depend on many interconnected structural factors in the countries of origin, transit or destination countries. Additionally, there might be an interplay between policies across European countries affecting the direction and intensity of flows within the region.

Main research gaps

- Limitations of international and European datasets. Main data sources on international migration produce statistics on migration stocks rather than flows, which does not allow describing the profile of newcomers arriving to Europe, but of settled migration population. There are also differences in procedures across EU/EFTA member states in granting permits, like humanitarian protection or for family reasons, which make the data less comparable. Even less is known about the profile of temporary and circular migrants. Similarly, most sample-based data sources focus on immigrant integration outcomes, not on who they are/were when arriving to Europe.
- Categorisation of migrants. Current statistical databases, like Eurostat sources, do not allow comprehensive description of migration flows by reason of entry, due to recording only one main reason of immigration. To respond to these limitations, policymakers should consider developing and using new ways of measuring and classifying migratory flows, capturing mixed nature of migratory forms. Further research could explore what mixed migration configurations would be useful for EU migration policy.
- Defragmentation of registers. European population registers are not linked (as the Nordic CPR), so migratory pathways of both EU/EFTA citizens and TCNs cannot be traced. Ultimately, various forms of intra-EU mobility and external immigration to Europe is not monitored jointly in order to anticipate their potential conjoint effects on labour markets and welfare systems.
- Managing migration. Currently, there is no clear-cut evidence that EU migration management efforts have had impact on the nature of migration flows to Europe, although it is very likely that increased border controls and treaties with neighbouring countries had an impact on limiting irregular migration and illegal border crossings. Yet, current data sources do not allow to determine the socio-economic characteristics of immigrants who managed to get to EU/EFTA countries in terms of socioeconomic profile (e.g. education, occupation, resources). As such, monitoring changes in the nature of migration flows is hardly possible.

The main EU policy frameworks on this topic

- The Common European Asylum System, which establishes common standards and promotes co-operation for a fairer and more equal asylum process across the EU (including the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive, the Dublin Regulation, and the EURODAC regulation).
- The Legal Migration Directives, which set common EU standards for the conditions of entry and stay as well as other rights of specific categories of migrants (including the Family Reunification Directive, the Long-Term Residents Directive, the EU Blue Card Directive for highly skilled workers, the Single Permit Directive, the Seasonal Workers Directive, the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive, and the Students and Researchers Directive).
- The Schengen external borders acquis, which governs border control of persons crossing the EU's external borders. Its main pillar is the Schengen Borders Code.
- The 2015 European Agenda on Migration, which includes several measures aimed at securing external borders, curbing irregular migration, modernising the Common European Asylum System, and effectively managing legal migration.

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WP7
Key Knowledge Questions on Migration **Governance**

The Future of Schengen Area and the European Common Asylum System

Introduction

This document aims to providing guidance to policymakers when approaching key questions and current debates regarding migration governance in the European Union (EU). We focus specifically on questions about the future of the Schengen area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). By so doing, we attempt to capture key lessons that can be learned from the existing knowledge base and guidance when addressing these questions going forward. The aim is thus to synthesise existing knowledge and to think about its implications for future actions.

Migration governance/policies: definitions and conceptualisation

Migration governance includes but is broader than migration policies. The latter refers to laws, regulations, decisions or other government directive related to the management of migration, while governance encompasses these elements and the factors related to the decision-making process and implementation. The emergence of the concept reflects a shift away from state-centred analyses of policies and a general recognition of the role of non-state actors in governing a specific policy field.

Definitions of governance commonly comprise components related to: i) norms, rules, institutions; ii) processes or methods of decision-making and of governing; and iii) processes or mechanisms of implementation and monitoring. Another common element is the recognition of the multiplicity of actors involved in shaping governing processes, ranging from public and state actors and private actors (i.e. private companies) to non-governmental and civil society representatives (voluntary and community sectors) or research and academic actors.

A key related conceptual development, which emerged in the 1990s in relation to the process of European integration, is the concept of multilevel governance (MLG). MLG enables analysis of the different levels or sites

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where policy making occurs, the multiple layers of government and the interactions between various types of public and private actor. It is highly relevant in the EU framework and context, and it is used in the study of migration governance, both at local and national levels. When considering global migration governance, the EU is simultaneously an actor in the global governance arena, and it constitutes in itself the most developed example of regional and supranational migration governance and interactions between national, regional and international norms.

Migration governance is a very broad term that refers to different categories of migration with different policy frameworks: labour migration (high skill, low skill, temporary), family migration, migration for study, refugee and international protection status, or irregular migration. These categories are not regulated in the same way and do not involve the same actors and institutions. In the context of the EU, there is also another fundamental distinction between mobility and migration; mobility refers to the intra-regional free movement of EU nationals within the Schengen area, and migration to movement from outside the EU by non-EU or third-country nationals (TCNs). Furthermore, matters of migration of third-country nationals (TCNs), mobility and asylum are distinct areas of EU governance, and they are not the subject of the same level of Europeanisation. While the admission of TCNs is a national competence, asylum management is more Europeanised (to varying degrees), and while the supranational dimension of Schengen is strong, the external border controls are largely intergovernmental. Despite these differences, the issues of asylum, border controls and intra-EU free movement are inextricably interconnected.

Policy relevance

The EU institutions have flagged the need to think beyond the migration/refugee crisis and to identify the scope for future development of EU migration

and asylum policies. In 2019, the appointment of a new Commission as well as the renewal of the European Parliament could provide an opportunity to rethink EU migration governance. In such a context, research findings can be helpful as research can adopt a longer-term, systemic perspective whereas policymakers are typically confronted with more immediate and pressing short- and medium-term questions. Research can also offer insights into lessons that can be learned from the effects of past interventions to inform future directions. A further important role for research on migration governance is that it can highlight good practices at national, sub-national and city-level that can inform future policymaking.

Not surprisingly, there has been significant growth in research on EU asylum governance since the 1990s. In general terms, this research evaluates how, why and with what effects migration and asylum have become a central component of EU action. Key moments and building blocks of the CEAS prompted an increased interest and research on the topic, such as during the first and then the second phase of development of the CEAS. Since the so-called migration or refugee crisis of 2015, matters of asylum, border controls and the Schengen area are at the top of the EU political agenda and have generated an increasing amount of research.

Reflecting political debate, much academic research that focused on the migration/refugee crisis of 2015 exposed the deficiencies (if not failures) of the EU asylum system and has coincided with high political salience. The 'crisis' revealed underlying divisions between member states (MS) about the scope, purpose and operation of common rules on the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees, particularly the Dublin regulation. With the large influx of arrivals through the Mediterranean Sea, the Schengen area has also reached a crisis point. Temporary internal border controls were reinstalled by few countries (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and France), crystallising a loss of trust in external border controls.

This has been interpreted as a crisis of policies, of institutions, and of solidarity and trust. It has refocused attention, gathered more resources and new actors. Prominent strands in the research literature deal with the question of whether institutional changes have led to policy changes. For example, has the empowerment of supranational institutions such as the European Parliament and the Court of Justice led to new policy directions? The research evidence would tend to be sceptical about the extent to which there has been a change in the underlying direction of policy. This is not to question that there has been significant institutional change, greatly increased resources and a much stronger political focus, but research

evidence suggests that the basic direction of travel for EU migration and asylum policy was established in the 1990s and 2000s and that the priorities established then have remained consistent components of EU actions and interventions since then. Research thus tends to emphasise 'path dependencies' and the shaping effects of policy legacies on current interventions. This does not mean that the future will replicate the successes and/or failures of the past, but that the range of possible approaches and interventions will be shaped by past approaches and interventions.

While it is not possible to predict future developments, research evidence on the effects of past and current approaches can usefully be used to contextualise the extent to which responses to the crisis can lead to basic reform of the EU migration and asylum system and the content of such reforms. For example, it is well known that there are significant divisions between member states, but there are some areas of potential agreement that draws from an existing emphasis on border controls and security. A criticism of such an approach that is prominent in the research literature is that this brings with it the significant risk of lowest common denominator approaches that focus on strengthened border controls and also on the continued externalisation of EU interventions to non-EU member states.

Overview of the key questions in the field

Key factors and dynamics

A core underlying question for research has been the motives for MS to cede aspects of their sovereign authority. Delegating authority to supranational institutions can be seen as a states' loss of control in response to increased interdependence and globalisation. Alternatively, it could be understood as an interest-driven response that allows states to maintain or even extend their power, capacity and authority. While there is debate in the research literature about the causes and effects of delegation, there is a basic agreement that cooperation on migration and asylum exposes core tensions around state sovereignty. For example, when assessing the driving forces behind the creation of the CEAS, research offers different perspectives and interpretations. On the one hand, a supranational dynamic can be seen as an impelling cooperation resulting from the spillover effects created by the establishment of the Schengen area (1985) and the Single European Act (1986). By this logic, the abolition of internal borders required common policies at external borders and measures to regulate asylum-seeking. In contrast, an intergovernmental alternative posits that cooperation was driven by a strong state-level dynamic where intergovernmental factors are important (in the 1990s with very strong influence from the German government).

Research does also suggest that this supranational versus intergovernmental dichotomy may be misplaced. In particular, there is significant research evidence of what is called 'transgovernmentalism' which highlights how cooperation and integration can lead to new kinds of networks that bring together national level officials as well as a wide range of other actors and that have established new ways of working on migration. An effect of this has been that participants have developed an enhanced understanding of the views and positions of their EU colleagues. This can mean that a strict intergovernmental perspective is undermined because of the frequency and intensity of interaction. At the same time, national level officials remain central to this process and can at times be resistant to supranational dynamics that might not be consistent with approaches at national level.

The result of this is:

- A vertical dynamic linking member states to the EU and its institutions
- A horizonal dynamic linking member states to each other

Within this horizontal dynamic there is also scope for smaller groups of 'likeminded' member states to work together.

Another key strand in research explores the ongoing effects of EU migration governance on (core) policy orientation and accounts for changes in strategic contexts and how different levels of governance interact and shape (or not) the policies. The key idea here is to look at how the organisation of governance itself can shape outcomes and approaches. This means analysis of the impacts and implications of the interactions between supranational institutions, member states (and their representatives, mainly Ministries of the Interior) on core migration policies (change or status quo), intergovernmental mechanisms, EU agencies, non-governmental organisations and a range of other actors, including scientific researchers. This strand of research is particularly of relevance today as it touches upon the core of the debates around the proposals of reforms of the CEAS, including differentiated speeds of EU integration and the future role and involvement of EU agencies.

Insights from the academic study of governance highlight that governance systems themselves can have powerful shaping effects on the issues with which they deal. This means that migration is not simply an external shock to which governance systems must respond, but also, through their operation and effects, governance systems shape the challenges that they face.

The effects of the crisis on the governance of migration and asylum in the EU

The 2015 'crisis' has powerfully shaped the discussions around asylum, border controls and Schengen. While there are frequent references to the crisis, there are scholarly debates about the meaning and relevance of the term 'crisis'. There is a fairly widespread agreement that it was not only a crisis of numbers (unprecedented number of arrivals), but a wider crisis of politics, institutions and political leadership that predates 2015. While the 'crisis' is part of the factors and dynamics shaping governance of migration and asylum, there is research evidence suggesting that responses to the 2015 crisis were shaped by previous responses and by the policy priorities set during the 1990s. Research on migration governance traces how policy legacies shape current responses, in order to explore how the 'shadow of the past' could shape responses to new challenges in the future.

Research has also highlighted how the understanding of migration phenomena amongst policymakers is influenced and informed by the perception that the current and future EU migration context is one of increased migratory pressure and migration arrivals. Understandings and perceptions affect what is considered 'normal' and, in turn, shape the policy actions. This is a relevant insight for policymaking: acknowledging the impact of how policymakers make sense of migration and in turn how this can frame responses. For example, while research findings highlight that there is new thinking among policymakers and a recognition of the need for new responses (e.g. more multi-institutional responses and new ways of thinking international action), it is still the case that interventions are constrained by understandings of migration that are predominantly influenced by destination countries' perspectives and less by the views of non-EU countries.

In addition, there is research on migration governance that accounts for the entry into the field of new actors and assesses the impact they have on how particular fields of migration are governed. There is a consensus that migration has become a 'whole of government' concern and that this brings new voices to the debate including governmental and non-governmental organisations. This array of new actors means that different understandings of the causes and effects of 'crisis' have been used to justify particular kinds of intervention which, in turn, have influenced migration governance across governance levels (sub-national, national, regional and international). The 2015 crisis had various impacts on the modes of governance, such as emergency-type modalities, on the framing and the discourses of migration issues and the emergence of new and diverse actors. This emerging line of research is relevant for policymaking as it helps to further delineate the new

roles and new influences of multiple actors in governing and responding to migration. For example, in times of emergency, states may increasingly devolve power and responsibilities to local governments and cities in the management of arrivals, notably concerning the reception of migrants. In the same vein, non-state actors also broadened their action and role during emergencies, or new actors stepped in, either international organisations or local and national civil society actors. Importantly, the crisis revealed an increased informalization of modes of governance (e.g. resorting to extra-treaty and extra-EU law instruments and to non-legal instruments outside of the EU framework).

Further, research on migration governance explores how emergency measures – while aimed at containing the effects of the emergency – also contributed to maintain a status quo and to safeguard the core of the system (i.e. hot spots, relocation scheme, new EU funding streams, or the revised mandate of EU agencies). An example is the delegation of more power and competences to agencies to Frontex, which has been transformed into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (2016). While the role of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) remains more limited, its future role is also under discussion and in the process of changing considerably.

Remaining gaps in the literature on migration governance

There is a comprehensive knowledge base on the causes and effects of the creation of the common asylum system. A key gap is not the lack of knowledge or evidence, but rather the need for an enhanced understanding of how existing knowledge relates to the 'real world' of decision-making, and how to better bridge and connect knowledge production and decision-making.

There is a tendency in the literature on EU migration governance to focus on the outputs or outcomes of governance processes (such as law, policies and the like). At the same time, research devotes less attention to the organisational processes of migration governance and policymaking. This gap can lead to shortcomings in a comprehensive understanding of the causes and effects of decision-making processes.

Linked to this is scope for an enhanced understanding of the shaping effects of governance itself, including, the effects of interactions between supranational institutions, intergovernmental agencies, MS and the other formal and informal sites of interaction between MS representatives; and, of the ways in which governance processes themselves can shape, affect or alter the decisions of migrants and would-be migrants. In that regard,

another gap in the literature is the lack of research based on original empirical data, such as original empirical data obtained through fieldwork. A deeper understanding of decision-making also includes an analysis of the effects of shifts in strategic contexts. For example, changes of composition of the European Commission and European Parliament could be addressed in research to assess more how these changes will influence the development of future policies and agreements.

In response to these gaps, one aspect that should be better integrated in research and considered by policymakers, is to look at good practices, at practices, policies and measures that are working well, at national, sub-national and city levels. Such good practices – some of them developed during the crisis – can also be applied at other governance levels. It would be relevant to look at specific and recent research on sharing best practices, research that is often based on the well-needed empirical evidence and fieldwork data (e.g. interviews, surveys).

In conclusion, in order to engage with questions about the future of the CEAS and the Schengen area, we need to understand the past and the evolution of knowledge in the field. The core priorities and competencies that have been decided in the context of EU integration will most likely remain (what is known as 'path dependency'). Further, there is a need for better understanding of the dynamics of decision-making, considering the everyday reality of compromises and trade-offs that characterise policy-making, at times of conciliation between competing or opposing objectives in response to a phenomenon that has a high level of uncertainty and to which significant risks are attached. In sum, policymakers can turn to research that do address these gaps and provide insights about good practices as well as a deeper understanding of policy making processes.

References to the main EU policy frameworks

- The Schengen Agreement signed on June 14, 1985, initially signed by five EU countries, led to the abolishment of the national borders between MS signatories within what is known as the "Schengen Area".
- EU Treaty Framework: With the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) migration and asylum became matters of common policy as they passed to the third pillar of community governance. Lisbon Treaty (2009) marked the full incorporation of migration and asylum within the Treaty framework as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is incorporated. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), article 80 provides for the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including any financial burdens, between Member States.
- The Dublin III Regulation: Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person
- A set of Directives regulating asylum: Asylum Procedures Directive (2013 recast), Reception Conditions Directive (2013 recast), the Qualification Directive (2011 recast.
- The EU Agenda on Migration, adopted in May 2015, provides a series of measures to address immediate challenges of migration flows and foresees tools for med- and long-term management of migration and asylum. Measures included the introduction of the hot spots and the emergency relocation mechanism.

Recommendations for key readings

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Note on references: For a complete list of references to academic and research work used for this paper, please consult the knowledge accumulation report.

WP7
Key Knowledge Questions on Migration **Governance**

The External Dimension of EU Migration Governance

Introduction

This document aims at providing guidance to policymakers when approaching key questions and current debates regarding migration governance in the European Union (EU). We focus on questions about the external dimension of migration governance. In doing so, we attempt to capture what the knowledge base, the research and publications on the topics, has told us so far and how it offers guidance in addressing these questions going forward.

The external dimension: definition and conceptualisation

The "external dimension" is the component of migration governance that extends beyond national borders and is at the crossroads between migration governance, foreign affairs and international relations. Generally, it is implemented through collaborations with third countries, with regional or sub-regional organisations, as well as international or civil society organisations.

A variety of concepts are used to describe and analyse this part of migration governance: the descriptive "external dimension"; those of "externalisation", "outsourcing", "delegation", "delocalisation", all of which emphasize the transfer of tasks to third party actors in different ways, most frequently foreign governments, and looking at the process through which these policies are developed and implemented. Other definitions such as "remote control" or "buffering" focus on people on the move, while terms such as "(re)bordering" or "border stretching" are used to describe the way this type of governance modifies the typology and the meaning of borders. In a first phase of the analysis of the external dimension during the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s, when scholars look at the enlargement of the EU and the Schengen area, the policy diffusion and transfer in the field of migration management was approached from the perspective of the "Europeanization" of migration policy.

Main actors involved in the field, with different and sometimes-overlapping competences are the national governments, supranational or

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intergovernmental institutions at the EU level (Parliament, Commission or Council). Moreover, other actors also intervene as 'contractors' - which often include EU and member state (MS) agencies, international organisations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) - to assure the implementation of specific parts of this governance.

The external dimension of migration governance constitutes a complex "multi-level" or "multi-layered" system of governance whose result can be considered patchwork, with a plethora of initiatives at different levels and in diverse political areas, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, very often overlapping in some way and lacking coherence.

The main pillars of the external dimension that are developed alongside third countries, either "transit" or origin countries of migration, are: returns of irregular migrants (forced or voluntary) and re-documentation of undocumented ones; enhancement of control of informal migration routes (both maritime and terrestrial) and also of "transit" mobility inside third countries' territory to filter mobility supposedly toward EU; exchange of information; realisation of joint patrols; as well as the presence of European liaison officers in third countries. Other more unilateral pillars are less visible but nevertheless have a key role in the external dimension and also impact upon relations with third countries: the EU common visa policy; and, carrier sanction mechanisms.

Policy relevance

The external dimension of EU migration governance has progressively become a key element of migration governance in Europe during the course of the last three decades. Since the 1990s, European MS have signed bilateral agreements targeting readmission and cooperation on migration control-specific examples include agreements signed between Spain and Morocco, Italy and Tunisia, and Italy and Libya. To a lesser extent, some agreements may also seek to foster formal mobility channels. At the EU level, the EU-

ACP (African Caribbean Pacific) agreement of Cotonou was signed in 2000, and included a specific clause on readmission. Moreover, two important instruments pushing the migration governance outside the EU were also developed in the beginning of the 2000s: the common Schengen visa list, published in 2001, and the Carrier Sanction Mechanism, established in 2001 (Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001).

During the first half of the 2000s, MS as Spain and Italy developed new action in this field, paired at the EU level by the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) which was presented by the European Commission in 2005. EU competence for negotiating readmission agreements was established along with the enforcement of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, but the rigidity of negotiation mandate, among other issues, limited progress in this area. Member states continued to develop and implement their external governance on a bilateral level with third countries, often supported by the EU. After the Arab Spring in 2011, a new Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) was presented by the EC. Progressively, the EU has increased efforts to coordinate these bilateral initiatives, leading EEAS and MSs to coordinate missions or to develop joint approaches for some key countries.

In the aftermath of the "refugee crisis" of 2015, a further deepening of the external dimension took place, whereas EU MS faced unprecedented numbers of arrivals, while at the same time being divided by heightened internal tensions. In November 2015, took place the La Valletta summit between Europe and Africa and the establishment of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). In 2016, the EU concluded a deal with Turkey, considered another step towards the further development of the external dimension of migration governance. In this case, the external dimension focused on preventing informal/irregular entries to EU MS. In addition, the EC released in 2016 a communication on establishing a new Migration Partnership Framework with third countries, where is recognised the possible use of negative conditionality, which could mean sanctions and penalties for third countries that did not collaborate sufficiently with EU migration policy.

Overview of the key questions in the field

What are the key dynamics of the external dimension?

When considering the key dynamics that shape the external dimension of migration governance, it is crucial to differentiate between short-, mid- and long-term focus. Each one will bring different perspectives on the external dimension and employ different tools. Research also underlines the importance of considering the high politicization of the issues at stake at MS level, as well

as an increased importance of the symbolic dimension of policy making within the EU – where rhetorical commitments may not be backed up by political actions. Most policies developed in this field, both at bilateral and multilateral levels in Europe, tend to be reactive and short-term. This means that decision and policymaking are a response to a perceived "migration crisis" occurring along EU borders, rather than being developed proactively with a mid- or long-term vision. Moreover, measures within the external dimension mainly focus the effects of migration phenomena, even if more recently, at least at the level of political narratives, there is an increased interest for issues related to the 'root causes' of migration, as in the case of the EUTF.

What are the key factors of the external dimension?

Looking at the key factors of the development and implementation of EU external migration policies, first, it is crucial to underline the fact that there is often a significant tension between endogenous and exogenous elements. Sometimes interests and political agendas may be fairly divergent, both within the EU – where obstacles or disagreements may arise between the EU and its MS – or with third countries. Non-EU governments, or other regional and sub-regional organizations, may not share the EU point of view on migration management, especially when these countries are producers of migration flows or where migration is not a politically salient concern. This fact determines that strategies of negotiation need to include strong incentives or powerful conditionality to foster an effective agreement. In this case, the use of development aid is considered one of the main motivations, as too are larger visa quotas, better economic conditions considering the third countries' products in the EU in addition to promises of foreign investments, or diplomatic support on specific political issues regarding the third country in question, among other issues.

To solve divergence of policy agendas and interests, the EU has also fostered the establishment of venues, generally managed by different IOs, where stakeholders from the EU and third countries and other regional organisations can meet and establish closer alignment and similar views on certain issues.

What are the key evolutions of negotiation?

Cooperation with the EU on migration control policy may represent a critical factor for third countries both in terms of their own domestic politics and in relation to their regional neighbours. At the same time, for the EU and its MS, agreements with third countries may cause issues to arise concerning accountability for cooperating with non-democratic or autocratic countries as well as responsibility for the negative effects of the external dimension on migrants and refugees, especially human rights concerns.

There is then an increasing use of informality concerning agreements in this field, especially related to the use of diplomatic means to address them. This informality drastically reduces transparency and prevents civil society and political parties from accessing the contents of the agreements, preventing an open forum for voicing their concerns and thus, further complicating and problematizing the issue of accountability.

What is known about efficiency and results?

To evaluate the results and gauge the efficiency of policy measures of the external dimension, it is necessary to define the main objectives of the external dimension, based on policy documents and declarations. The main three objectives are: diminishing irregular crossings/arrivals; reducing the number of migrant deaths when trying to access Europe; and fighting against smugglers and trafficking activities.

1. Reducing irregular crossings/arrivals by sea or land. In the short term, cooperation with third countries or other regional or sub-regional organisations has reduced flows in specific migration corridors. However, considering flows over the long-term, as well as with a larger geographical lens, the result is not so clear: very often the decrease in flows of a single migratory path may be followed by an increase in another migratory route, more or less connected to the previous one, but often-times more dangerous.
2. Reducing the number of deaths at the EU border. Evidence shows a progressive increase of fatalities at EU borders and outside the EU despite the growing external dimension. Displacement of migration paths results in riskier and less controlled routes leading to increased fatalities. This can be further complicated by the practices of third countries- such as indiscriminate roundups, re-expulsions and detentions- but also by increased activity of traffickers and smugglers.
3. Fighting against smugglers and trafficking activities, evidence shows that enhanced controls in transit spaces increase prices of border-crossing services provided by various and more or less structured facilitators. Moreover, due to the external dimension, refugees also experience a growing need to request services of smugglers or traffickers to access asylum systems.

Scientific evidence underlines that the employment of the external dimension as a key deterrent for irregular migrations to Europe produces serious and adverse results in terms of increased risks, violence, the growing possibility of death and violations to human rights in attempts to access

the EU, while the deterrent effect is not as effective as perceived. Further field-based research on these issues will allow a deeper understanding of these interactions.

What has been ignored and needs to be considered in future policy evolutions?

A wide variety of scientific evidence also suggests that several elements have been neglected in the external dimension of migration governance. These elements could be integrated into both policy and evaluation processes. First, it is essential to mention the consequences of the external dimension on human rights of the people on the move. Second, practical limitations on the right to asylum are produced by the external dimension with a potential indiscriminate buffering of the mobility of migrants and of asylum seekers. Third, the EU external dimension may cause limitations in the pre-existing free-movement agreements outside Europe, as it is the case of ECOWAS, and interference with migration systems that are not directed towards the EU, as inter-African mobility. Finally, further consideration is needed of how violence and criminality can affect migrants and refugees in spaces outside Europe, as a consequence of cooperation fostered by EU with third countries.

What are the main gaps that may affect future governance developments?

There are several existing knowledge gaps that may affect the ultimate feasibility and effectiveness of policy measures in the external dimension. The main ones include:

At the level of the decision-making process

- the informal and opaque aspect of the decision-making and the negotiation process
- the empirical knowledge of policy–making dynamics in third countries
- the evolution and trends in the collaboration between EU and MS on the external dimension, also considering the interaction with the internal dynamics concerning migration governance.

A deeper and more empirical-based scientific knowledge of these issues of the policy making, both at EU and third-countries level, will enhance the chances to establish a more coherent, effective and profitable cooperation for all parts.

At the level of the implementation

- the empirical knowledge of policy implementation and proper assessment of its impact on third countries
- the growing role of IOs, but also of CSOs, NGOs and other governmental actors and agencies in the implementation, reporting, evaluation and contestation of external dimension

Scientific evidence on these elements will enhance effectiveness of cooperation through a more complete understanding of social and political priorities by all countries and a more comprehensive implementation.

At the level of the impacts' assessment

- the analysis of economic and diplomatic costs as well as the evaluation in terms of costs and benefits for the EU and the MS
- the EU dependency on third countries' migration control and possible consequences
- the impact on democratisation processes in third countries, in respect of human rights for both migrants and third countries citizens
- the impact on the external image of EU as a global actor

An extensive and empirical-based assessment of results, both intended and unintended, of the external dimension will allow to improve effectiveness, through reducing the gap between objectives and results, to increase policy coherence with other political areas, and to avoid 'collateral effects' towards human security and human rights.

References to the main EU Policy Frameworks on this topic

- EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), developed since 2004, actually through the funding of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).
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- Global Approach on Migration and Mobility (GAMM) of 2011, including the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment and the Rabat Process (in the South), the Khartoum Process (targeting the migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe), the Prague Process, and the Eastern Partnership panel on Migration and Asylum (in the East), the migration dialogue with Latin America, and dialogue with the countries along the Silk-route, including in the framework of the Budapest Process. Mobility Partnerships (MP) have been signed with Cape Verde, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Morocco, Azerbaijan, Tunisia, Jordan and Belarus; Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMM) have been signed with Ethiopia and Nigeria.
- Western Mediterranean 5 + 5 Dialogue
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Note on references: For a complete list of references to academic and research work used for this paper, please consult the knowledge accumulation report.

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